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This paper studies the implications for international portfolio diversiﬁcation of a simple OLG model
of the world economy with transaction costs. Our main result shows that the introduction of very small
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The home bias in equity stands as one of the major puzzles in international ﬁnance. Since the
1970s, ﬁnancial economists have noted, that the proportion of foreign assets held by domestic
investors is too small relative to the predictions of standard portfolio theory. Despite the growing
literature1 devoted to this paradox, few convincing explanations have yet been proposed to explain
this phenomenon. Recently, Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000) argued that the home bias puzzle in equity,
like other major international macroeconomic puzzles, could in principle be explained by transaction
costs. However, Cooper and Kaplanis (1994)’s costs estimates, based on a standard international
capital asset pricing model with an assumed level of risk aversion consistent with observed estimates
of domestic equity premium, are about a few percent per annum greater than observable costs such
as withholding taxes. This calls into question the empirical relevance of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ’s
conjecture. This paper looks at this issue in greater details. More speciﬁcally, it builds and
simulates a two countries dynamic general equilibrium model with small transaction costs to see if
such a model can reproduce observed home bias in equity holdings.
II Home bias in portfolio selection
Figure 1 graphs, for a number of countries, the share of domestic assets in each country portfolio
against the country share in the world market portfolio. Data are taken from O.E.C.D. Financial
Accounts and the Financial Times, and refer to asset positions as of December 31st 1994. Standard
theory suggests that fully diversiﬁed portfolios should contain domestic and foreign assets in pro-
portion of each country share in the world market portfolio. This means that countries portfolios
should all lie along the diagonal in Figure 1. The vertical distance between each point and the
1See French and Poterba (1991), Cooper and Kaplanis (1994), Tesar and Werner (1995), Lewis (1999) and Co¨ en
(2001).
1Figure 1: The home bias on December 31st 1994
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diagonal measures portfolios bias in favor of domestic assets. As it is clear from Figure 1, countries
portfolios showed a high concentration in domestic assets in the mid 1990s. Home bias estimates
range from a minimum of 40.7 %,in the case of the United Kingdom, to a maximum of 99 % for
Sweden. Other estimates of the home bias reported the literature revealed a similar pattern. As a
conclusion, one can safely say that the preference for domestic assets is widespread and sizable. The
revealed preference for domestic assets, known in the literature as the home bias puzzle, is diﬃcult
to reconcile with standard portfolio theory which advocates domestic investors to fully diversiﬁed
internationally their portfolios.
2III The Model
Portfolio selection is studied within the framework of a two-countries overlapping generations model
of the world economy. The countries are identiﬁed as domestic (D) and foreign (F), and all variables
are labeled accordingly. Production in both economies is stochastic. For simplicity, and without loss
of generality, we assume there exists only two states of the world determining the vector (yi
D;yi
F)
of domestic and foreign outputs for state i = 1;2. When necessary, the superscript is used to index
the state of the world. We describe choices from the perspective of the domestic country residents.
The model is symmetric and foreign agents face similar choices. Agents live two periods and there
is a single agent in each generation. Countries are composed of two generations, the young and the
old. In any period t, the domestic young supplies labour inelasticly to ﬁrms in exchange of a wage
income wD;t. By assumption, labour is not traded internationally and domestic young cannot work
for foreign ﬁrms. The young uses his labour income to purchase cyD;t units of consumption goods
and to buy zD;t and xD;t shares of domestic and foreign ﬁrms. Shares are traded in the ﬁnancial
markets at prices qD;t and qF;t respectively. Financial markets are incomplete and only stocks
of domestic and foreign ﬁrms are traded. A distinctive feature of this model is that investments
made in foreign ﬁnancial assets induce a transaction cost (µ¢qF;t ¢xD;t) proportional to the amount
invested abroad, where µ determines the extent of this cost.2 This is meant to capture direct costs,
such as withholding taxes, but also indirect costs, such as informational costs borne by investors
when purchasing foreign risky assets. As a result, young agent budget constraint can be expressed
as:
cyD;t + qD;t ¢ zD;t + qF;t ¢ xD;t ¢ (1 + µ) = wD;t
2These costs may be direct costs such as taxes, or indirect costs such as the implied cost of information asymmetries.
3Agents retire in old age and consume all their investment income.3 Therefore, consumption in
period t of the representative old agent, having purchased the portfolio of shares (zD;t¡1;xD;t¡1) the
period before when the state of the world was state j, must obey the following budget constraint:
coD;t = z
j
D;t¡1 ¢ [dD;t + qD;t] + x
j
D;t¡1 ¢ [dF;t + qF;t]:
Where dD;t and dF;t are period t dividends per share made by domestic and foreign ﬁrms.
The two states of the world occur with probability ¼ and (1 ¡ ¼) respectively. From the
perspective of the domestic country, state 1 is the high income state while state 2 is the low income
state. To stress the role of transaction costs, we make the strong assumption that countries states
of the world are perfectly negatively correlated, i.e. the high (low) income state in the domestic
country always coincides with the low (high) income state in the foreign country. This assumption
is made to strengthen the incentive for international portfolio diversiﬁcation and to make the
replication of observed home bias much more diﬃcult. In absence of transaction costs and other
barriers to international investment, countries should always hold fully diversiﬁed portfolios when
the states of the world are perfectly negatively correlated.
Firms maximize proﬁts. They produce output using capital and labour as factor inputs. Tech-
nology is Cobb-Douglas and exhibits constant return to scale. Labour markets are competitive.
As a result, domestic and foreign labour income is a fraction of output, i.e. wH;t = ®H ¢ yH;t
for H = D;F, where ®H is country H parameter of the Cobb-Douglas production function. The
capital stock is ﬁxed and cannot be augmented through investment.4 There is no retained earnings
and all capital income is paid out as dividend to shareholders. Normalizing the number of shares
to unity, the dividend per share can be expressed as dH;t = (1 ¡ ®H) ¢ yH;t for H = D;F.
3For simplicity, we abstract from any bequest motives.
4We think of capital as land.
4Young agent maximizes discounted lifetime expected utility. Therefore, in state of the world i,

























under the budget constraints:
cyi





























; j = 1;2
Where ¯ is the discount factor and U(¢) is the instantaneous utility function that will be assumed
below to be of the CRRA type with risk aversion parameter °. As mentioned above, the model is
symmetric and foreign agents face a similar problem.
In general equilibrium all markets must clear. That is:5
cyD;t + coD;t + cyF;t + coF;t = yD;t + yF;t ¡ (qF;t ¢ xD;t + qD;t ¢ zF;t) ¢ µ
zD;t + zF;t = 1
xD;t + xF;t = 1
Observe that the goods market clearing condition takes into consideration the transaction costs
induced by asset trades.
Even though the model is simple, analytical solutions cannot be found and one must revert to
numerical analysis to study its predictions on international portfolio diversiﬁcation. In a stationary
rational expectations competitive equilibrium, domestic and foreign young agents make portfolio
selections, taking equilibrium asset prices as given, that clear asset markets and yield asset prices
equal to those taken as given. This equilibrium can be computed numerically as the solution of a
system of equations formed by the ﬁrst order conditions of the domestic and foreign young agents
choice problems together with market clearing conditions.
5Observe that this optimization problem already presumes equilibrium in the labour market.
5IV Simulations and results
This section of the paper reports our simulation results. Before proceeding, a few words should






. In the simulations, we
have set ® at 0.65 in both countries. This roughly matches the share of labour income in advanced
market economies such as the US. The discount factor ¯ is set to 0.97 which is consistent with a
3 % world real interest rate. We assume that the high income state is 5 % higher than the low
income state. Given the importance of ° and µ, we choose to report results for a wide range of
values. Following the recommendations of Ferson (1982)6 and Cooper and Kaplanis (1994), we
allow the risk aversion parameter ° to vary between a low value of 0.5 and a high value of 10. Our
main objective in this paper is to show that small transaction costs can explained large home bias.
Accordingly, we consider small values of µ ranging from 0 to 0.015.
Figure 2 represents the average share of domestic assets in agent’s portfolio for the range of
° and µ mentioned above. As one can easily see from this ﬁgure, the model predicts that agents
should hold perfectly diversiﬁed portfolios when there is no transaction cost. The ﬁgure also shows
that it does not take a large transaction cost to induce agent to hold a signiﬁcant share of their
portfolio in domestic assets. For instance, investors hold on average 91 % of their portfolio in
domestic assets when the coeﬃcient of risk aversion is 2 and the transaction cost is only 0.25 %.
Moreover, if we increase µ to around 0.31 %, domestic and foreign agents invest their portfolios in
domestic assets only. This simple result seems to demonstrate that a low cost is able to reproduce
the home bias observed in the composition of portfolios. Figure 3 represents simulated average
home bias. Looking back at Figure 1, one can see that empirical home bias can be reproduced by
the model even under the extreme assumption of perfectly negatively correlated output.
6Providing a range of 0 < ° < 5:3 for the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion for the United States, Ferson (1982)
estimates that 2 is the most convenient value.












































7The required level for the transaction cost is surprisingly low compared to cost estimates found in
the ﬁnancial literature. For instance, Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) conclude that a cost of more
than 2 % per annum is necessary to explain the 98 % share of domestic ﬁnancial assets in the
portfolio of a typical American investor with a coeﬃcient of risk aversion of 2.7
V Conclusion
Using a very simple overlapping generations model, we have shown that in a world without any
barrier to international investment, where all is done to induce international diversiﬁcation, a
very low transaction cost (including existing taxes, informational costs, or any other constraint to
the international diversiﬁcation) can generate the home bias observed in portfolio holdings. This
conclusion, obtained in a very simple model gives weight to Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000) conjecture
that transaction costs are useful to explain the major puzzles in international macroeconomics.
7Cooper and Kaplanis estimate the costs of inward and outward investment for an American investor with co-
eﬃcient of risk aversion between 1.5 and 2.5. The relations between costs and coeﬃcients of risk aversion are
proportional.
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